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ABSTRACT
The uncovered interest rate parity equation is the cornerstone of most models in international macro.
However, this equation does not hold empirically since the forward discount, or interest rate
differential, is negatively related to the subsequent change in the exchange rate. This forward
discount puzzle is one of the most extensively researched areas in international finance. It implies
that excess returns on foreign currency investments are predictable. In this paper we propose a new
explanation for this puzzle based on rational inattention. We develop a model where investors face
a cost of collecting and processing information. Investors with low information processing costs
trade actively, while other investors are inattentive and trade infrequently. We calibrate the model
to the data and show that (i) inattention can account for most of the observed predictability of excess
returns in the foreign exchange market, (ii) the benefit from frequent trading is relatively small so
that few investors choose to be attentive, (iii) average expectational errors about future exchange
rates are predictable in a way consistent with survey data for market participants, and (iv) the model
can account for the puzzle of delayed overshooting of the exchange rate in response to interest rate
shocks.
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One of the best established puzzles in international ￿nance is the forward discount
puzzle. Fama (1984) illuminated the problem with a regression of the monthly
change in the exchange rate on the preceding one-month forward premium. The
uncovered interest rate parity equation, which is the cornerstone of many models
in international macro, implies a coe￿cient of one. But surprisingly Fama found a
negative coe￿cient for each of nine di￿erent currencies. This evidence implies that
excess returns on foreign currency investment are predictable.1 Using more recent
data from 1978 to 2004, panel A of Table 1 presents evidence for the average of
5 currencies against the US dollar. A regression of the 3-month excess return of
a foreign currency investment on the preceding 3-month forward discount yields
an average coe￿cient of -2.5.2 Similar evidence of excess return predictability
has been extensively documented for stock and bond markets. While there are
potential statistical problems in these predictability regressions, they do not fully
explain the results.3
In this paper we focus on the foreign exchange market. Two sets of explanations
for the forward discount puzzle have been proposed in the literature: time-varying
risk premia and predictable expectational errors. In the ￿rst approach, the risk
premium is both time varying and negatively correlated with the forward premium.
Numerous studies have attempted to implement this explanation, but so far have
fallen short of explaining the puzzle.4 In the second approach investors make
1For surveys see Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996). Some of the more recent contributions on
the forward discount puzzle include Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001), Beakert, Hodrick and
Marshall (1997), Chaboud and Wright (2005), Chinn and Meredith (2005), Chinn and Frankel
(2002), Fisher (2005), Flood and Rose (2001), Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Mark and Wu
(1998) and Sarno, Valente and Leon (2004). Sarno (2005) provides a recent survey.
2The regression in Panel A of Table 1 is qt+1 = ￿+￿fdt +ut+1 where qt+1 = st+1 ￿st ￿fdt
is the excess return on an investment in foreign currency, st is the log nominal exchange rate and
fdt is the forward discount.
3The main statistical problems of excess return regressions relate to small sample bias and
bias caused by the persistence of right hand side variables (e.g. forward discount, interest rate
or dividend yield). However, these problems usually can only explain a part of the total bias.
See, for example, Stambaugh (1999), Campbell and Yogo (2005), or Liu and Maynard (2005).
4See the surveys by Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996), which reach this conclusion. Bekaert,
Hodrick and Marshall (1997) ￿nd that even a model with ￿rst-order risk aversion, in which
risk-premia are very volatile, cannot account for the evidence.
1predictable expectational errors about future exchange rates that are negatively
correlated with the forward premium. Froot and Frankel (1989) use exchange rate
survey data to show that this can explain the entire forward discount bias. Using
an updated data set, Panel B of Table 1 presents evidence for 5 currencies show-
ing that expectational errors by market participants about future exchange rates
continue to be highly predictable by the forward discount.5 While the empirical
evidence appears more consistent with this second explanation, many researchers
feel uneasy because predictable expectational errors appear to imply deviations
from rationality.
In this paper we propose an explanation for the forward discount puzzle where
investors are rational, but may make predictable expectational errors. There are
signi￿cant costs associated both with collecting information, processing informa-
tion and making decisions based on that information. These costs are added to
the usual transaction costs. This makes it optimal for many investors to only in-
frequently assess available information and revise portfolios.6 Investors may there-
fore be rationally inattentive, which gives rise to predictable expectational errors.
Froot and Thaler (1990) and Lyons (2001) have informally argued that models
where some agents are slow in responding to new information may explain the
forward discount puzzle. Here we formally show that a model with rational inat-
tention calibrated to the data can explain the forward bias puzzle. In a companion
paper (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005), we show that a similar mechanism can
5The survey data is from Forecasts Unlimited Inc. It is based on monthly forecasts by 43
￿nancial institutions from 1986 to 2004. See Bacchetta, Mertens, and van Wincoop (2005) for
more details.
6Transaction costs are fundamentally di￿erent in that they are only incurred if assets are
traded. After observing the state of nature each period, investors can decide whether to trade
or not. These are state-dependent decision rules. By contrast, information processing costs
are incurred whether the resulting information leads to any transactions or not. In contrast to
transaction costs, the decision about when to incur these costs is not based on current informa-
tion, but on past information. They lead to time-dependent decision rules, whereby investors
process information infrequently and decide in advance when to process information next. The
two types of costs can interact though. When there are information processing costs, investors
process information less frequently when they also face transaction costs. Baldwin (1990) studies
deviations from uncovered interest rate parity that arise as a result of transaction costs alone. In
that case investors do not make predictable expectational errors since they continuously process
all available information.
2explain excess return predictability in the stock market.
While it is well recognized that individual investors often trade infrequently and
make infrequent portfolio decisions,7 it is less obvious that such inattention would
not be largely unraveled by institutions that trade very actively on the market.
There are nonetheless good reasons to believe that such unraveling by attentive
traders only takes place to a limited extent. First, the most active institutions
in terms of trading volume tend to own only a small fraction of the wealth. For
example, two thirds of trade in the foreign exchange market is done among banks
that are foreign exchange dealers (BIS, 2004). These dealers follow the markets
very closely during the course of a trading day, but hold very little foreign exchange
overnight. Hedge funds are also extremely active, but still represent only a small
share of ￿nancial wealth.8 Second, while some mutual funds trade very actively on
the market, by law these trades are severely restricted to the asset class de￿ned by
the fund. They generally have little room in terms of switching between domestic
and foreign securities. Those decisions are ultimately made by the investors in
the mutual funds themselves. Finally, the ability of attentive investors to exploit
expected pro￿t opportunities is reduced both by risk-aversion and the signi￿cant
uncertainty surrounding future exchange rate changes. While excess returns are
predictable, the R2 of such regressions tends to be small.
Our theoretical analysis is related to recent developments in the stock market
literature. On the one hand, several studies show how asset allocation is a￿ected
by predictability.9 On the other hand, some recent papers examine the impact
7See Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) for a description of infrequent trading and decision
making in the stock market. The far majority of investors does not make any transactions during
a particular year, either regarding directly held stocks or mutual fund investments. As many
as 85% of investors report that they follow a buy-and-hold strategy. Systematic evidence is
typically not recorded for the foreign exchange market, but trade in the foreign exchange market
is closely related to international trade in stocks, bonds and other assets. Infrequent portfolio
reallocation across markets is consistent with the evidence of Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes
(2001). They show that cross-country equity ￿ows react with lags to a change in returns, while
the contemporaneous reaction is muted.
8Based on data reported by Hedge Fund Research, in 2003 total assets under management
worldwide by hedge funds represented less than 1% of U.S. ￿nancial wealth.
9See for example Kandel and Stambaugh (1996), Campbell and Viceira (1999), or Barberis
(2000).
3of infrequent trading due to limited attention in asset markets.10 However, the
literature has not linked predictability with infrequent trading: those papers that
examine the impact of predictability assume it exogenous, while papers that ex-
amine infrequent trading do not examine its impact on asset prices. Our paper
departs from the existing literature by incorporating both predictability and ra-
tional inattention and by showing that the latter can cause the former.11
We develop a model for the foreign exchange market with two key features.
First, it is a general equilibrium model where the exchange rate is determined en-
dogenously. This endogeneity is critical to shed light on excess return predictabil-
ity. Second, investors choose whether to be attentive or inattentive. Attentive
investors make portfolio decisions each period, but face a periodic cost of doing so.
Inattentive investors make infrequent portfolio decisions. Investors choose to be
inattentive when the welfare gain from frequent portfolio decisions is less than the
associated cost. The decision to be inattentive is therefore perfectly rational as
investors need to take into account the opportunity cost associated with frequent
information processing and decision making. Investors who face a relatively low
cost of information processing will choose to be attentive, while others choose to
be inattentive. Inattention leads to a delay by which new information is re￿ected
in the exchange rate, causing predictable excess returns.
We calibrate the model to data for ￿ve industrialized countries on which the
empirical evidence in Table 1 is based. The main results can be summarized as
follows. First, in equilibrium only a small portion of investors will ￿nd it worthwhile
to be attentive. We ￿nd that it is optimal for 95% of investors to make portfolio
decisions only once in 5 quarters when they face an annual information processing
cost of at least 2.4% of ￿nancial wealth. This is less than what is charged by
most hedge funds, for example. The remaining investors have a lower information
processing cost and make portfolio decisions every quarter. Second, a regression
of the quarterly excess return of foreign bonds on the forward discount yields a
10Du￿e and Sun (1990), Lynch (1996), Gabaix and Laibson (2002), and Peng and Xiong (2005)
have all developed models where investors make infrequent portfolio decisions because of a ￿xed
cost of information collection and decision making.
11The paper is also related to a growing literature in macroeconomics based on rational inat-
tention, in particular in the context of price setting by ￿rms and consumption decisions by
households. Examples are Sims (1998, 2003), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2005), Mankiw and
Reis (2002), Moscarini (2004), Reis (2004a,b) and Carroll (2003).
4large negative coe￿cient of -1.74. Third, we ￿nd that average expectational errors
about future exchange rates are predictable by the forward discount and in the
same direction as in the data. Fourth, even though excess returns are predictable
in the model, this is overshadowed by uncertainty. The R2 of the excess return
regression is very low, again consistent with the data. Finally, the model implies
delayed overshooting in response to interest rate shocks. Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995) ￿rst documented that after a rise in the interest rate a currency continues
to appreciate for about another year before it starts to depreciate. This is another
puzzle in international ￿nance that standard models cannot explain.12
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide
some basic intuition for how inattention can lead to the predictability of excess
returns. In section 3 we present the foreign exchange model and the solution
procedure. In section 4, we calibrate the model to the data and we show that it
can explain the forward discount and delayed overshooting puzzles. We discuss in
detail the various aspects leading to these results. Section 5 concludes.
2 How Does Inattention Explain Predictability?
In this section we provide some intuition for the impact of inattention on excess
return predictability. Without a formal model, the explanation has been suggested
earlier by Froot and Thaler (1990) and Lyons (2001). Consider an increase in the
domestic interest rate. This causes an increased demand for domestic bonds and an
appreciation of the domestic currency. If the expected excess return were zero, the
exchange rate would subsequently be expected to depreciate since Et(st+1 ￿ st) =
it ￿ i￿
t. But if investors are slow to respond to the news of a higher domestic
interest rate, there will be a continued reallocation of portfolios towards domestic
bonds after the shock. In that case the initial appreciation is smaller and the
currency will continue to appreciate subsequent to the shock. This leads to a
negative relationship between the forward discount and the subsequent change in
the exchange rate, as ￿rst documented by Fama (1984). It implies a coe￿cient of
less than -1 of a regression of the excess return on the forward discount. It is also
consistent with evidence of delayed overshooting.
12Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) explain both predictability and delayed overshooting with
distorted beliefs on the interest rate process.
5The impact of inattention on the equilibrium asset price is driven by the dy-
namic response of the portfolio di￿erential bI
t ￿bA
t , where bA
t and bI
t are the fraction
invested in Foreign bonds by attentive and inattentive agents. If for example a













The second term on the right-hand side of (1) depends on the portfolio di￿erential.
The role of inattention is captured by this additional demand term. It tells us
how the demand function for foreign bonds shifts due to inattention. Without
modeling the behavior of either attentives or inattentives, to which we turn in
the next section, assume for now that the portfolio of inattentives responds more
slowly to new information than the portfolio of attentives.
Consider again a rise in the domestic interest rate. This causes bA
t to fall because
attentives shift their portfolio towards domestic bonds. But because inattentives
are slow to respond, the fraction invested in foreign bonds by inattentives will rise
relative to that of attentives. This amounts to an increase in demand for foreign
bonds due to inattention, captured by the last term in (1). Over time this gap
will close as inattentives catch up. Therefore, investors expect the demand for
foreign bonds to fall over time. This dynamic e￿ect is of key importance to excess
return predictability and is related to the intuition by Froot and Thaler (1990)
and Lyons (2001). An expected decline in demand for foreign bonds associated
with the gap bI
t ￿ bA
t leads by itself to an expected appreciation of the domestic
currency and therefore to a negative relationship between the forward discount and
the subsequent change in the exchange rate. When this e￿ect is strong enough it
can more than o￿set the positive relationship between the forward discount and
the subsequent change in the exchange rate that is due to the behavior of attentive
agents in isolation.13
Inattention only matters to the extent that shocks a￿ect relative asset supplies.
In the example above, if interest rate shocks have no e￿ect on relative asset supplies,
then the portfolio of attentives would not change in equilibrium. In that case
13There is also a level e￿ect on the exchange rate due to the increase in the expected present
value of demand for foreign bonds associated with the inattention gap bI
t ￿ bA
t . However, it has
no e￿ect on excess return predictability since st+1 ￿ st is una￿ected by a permanent demand
shock that leads to a permanent change in the exchange rate.
6it makes no di￿erence if some investors are inattentive. Relative asset supplies
change naturally though in response to interest rate shocks since it a￿ects the
exchange rate and therefore relative asset supplies if bond supplies are ￿xed in
local currencies.
3 A Model of Rational Inattention
In this section we present a model of rational inattention applied to the foreign
exchange market. We ￿rst describe the basic structure of the model and then
discuss the solution method. Some technical details are covered in the Appendix,
with a Technical Appendix available on request providing full technical detail.
3.1 Model’s Description
3.1.1 Basic Setup
We will describe a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model. Our overall
approach is to keep the model as simple as possible while retaining the key ingre-
dients needed to highlight the role of rational inattention. There is a single good
and purchasing power parity: pt = st + p￿
t, where pt is the log-price level of the
good in the Home country and st the log of the nominal exchange rate. Foreign
country variables are indicated with a star. There are three assets: one-period
nominal bonds in both currencies issued by the respective governments and a risk-
free technology with real return ￿ r.14 Bonds are in ￿xed supply in the respective
currencies.15 There are overlapping generations of investors who each live T + 1
periods and derive utility from end of life wealth. Each period a total of n new
investors are born, endowed with one unit of the good that can be invested in the
three assets.
14This is necessary to tie down the real interest rate since the model does not contain saving
and investment decisions. Otherwise equality between savings and investment would tie down
the real interest rate.
15Bonds are issued by the respective governments. One can think of governments owning
claims on the riskfree technology whose proceeds are su￿cient to pay the interest on the debt.
The remainder is thrown in the water or spent on public goods that have no e￿ect on the marginal
utility from private consumption.
7We will ￿rst describe the monetary policy rules adopted by central banks, then
the modeling of inattention and optimal portfolio choice, and ￿nally asset market
clearing.
3.1.2 Monetary Policy
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t is the target log price level, which we will simply set at zero. With this
Wicksellian policy rule the central bank cares about the price level.16 It can also be
derived from a standard money market equilibrium equation, where money demand
depends negatively on the interest rate with coe￿cient 1=  and ut represents
money demand and supply shocks. It is assumed that ut follows an AR process
with normally distributed innovations.
As a simplifying assumption we assume that   ! 1 for the Home country, so
that the central bank in the Home country commits to a constant price level. This
implies zero in￿ation, so that it = ￿ r. Without loss of generality we assume that
the constant domestic price level is 1, so that pt = 0 and p￿
t = ￿st. The Foreign
interest rate rule can therefore also be written as
i
￿
t = ￿ st ￿ ut (4)
These assumptions imply that there are in essence only two assets, one with a
risk-free real return ￿ r and one with a stochastic real return. The latter is Foreign
bonds, which has a real return of st+1 ￿ st + i￿
t. This setup leads to much simpler
portfolios than we would get under symmetric monetary policy rules, in which case
the real return on Home and Foreign bonds would both be stochastic.
3.1.3 Modeling Inattention
Three elements make it di￿cult to solve a general dynamic model with rational
inattention. First, investors need to make decisions about the frequency of infor-
16See Woodford (2003) for a discussion.
8mation processing.17 Second, portfolio decisions are much more complicated when
expected returns are time varying. Third, the exchange rate is endogenous.
For tractability reasons, we simplify decisions about the frequency of informa-
tion processing. Since investors live T + 1 periods, they can make a maximum
of T portfolio decisions. We assume that when investors are born they have the
choice to either make one portfolio decision for the next T periods or actively
manage their portfolio each period.18 Active portfolio management leads to higher
expected portfolio returns, but it involves a per-period information processing cost
of ￿i as a fraction of investor i’s wealth. Dependent on the information processing
cost they face, some investors (a fraction f) will choose to actively manage their
portfolio. We call them \attentives". The remaining fraction 1 ￿ f of investors
will make only one portfolio decision. We call them \inattentives". At any point
in time there will be T generations of attentive and inattentive investors.
It is useful to de￿ne the cost of being inattentive ￿(f) such that the expected
utility of an investor is the same under both investment strategies; this cost depends
obviously on the number of attentive investors in the market. Investor i will decide
to be attentive if ￿i < ￿(f) and inattentive when ￿i > ￿(f). In equilibrium, f is
determined by the distribution of ￿i over investors. If f(￿) is a di￿erentiable
cumulative distribution function of this cost, the equilibrium level f￿ is such that
f(￿(f￿)) = f￿. This determines the threshold information processing cost ￿￿ =
￿(f￿). Investors with a lower information processing cost will be attentive, while
others rationally choose to be inattentive.
Attentive investors in the model make multi-period portfolio decisions. With
time-varying expected returns the portfolio choice problem will be signi￿cantly
17In some models of rational inattention, based on Information Theory, investors also choose
what type of information to collect. See for example Sims (1998, 2003) and Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2005). In these models, where investors have a limited capacity to process informa-
tion, investors process a limited amount of information each period. However, Moscarini (2004)
has shown that when the capacity can be increased at a cost, it is optimal for investors to process
information infrequently rather than each period.
18This is a simpli￿cation relative to a more general setup where investors have in￿nite lives
and need to decide on the frequency of information processing. Such a setup is unfortunately
intractable when combined with the endogeneity of asset returns. The few papers in ￿nance
where the frequency of transactions is endogenous due to information processing costs, such as
Du￿e and Sun (1990) and Gabaix and Laibson (2002), assume exogenous asset returns that are
uncorrelated over time.
9more complicated due to a hedge against changes in future expected returns. Solu-
tions to multi-period portfolio problems with time-varying expected returns have
only been derived in the literature for exogenous returns.19 For the purpose of
solving the equilibrium exchange rate we approximate the portfolio of attentive
investors as the optimal portfolio of one-period investors. This omits the hedge
term. Once we have solved for the equilibrium exchange rate we also compute
the precise portfolio. That problem is tractable since we have already solved for
the exchange rate and therefore the stochastic process of the return on Foreign
bonds is given. We ￿nd that the hedge term is non-zero and time varying, but
swamped by the regular myopic portfolio term that depends on expected returns
and risk. The correlation between the two portfolios is larger than 0.9999. The
approximation is therefore very accurate.
Once we have solved for the equilibrium exchange rate for a given f, we can
compute ￿(f) by comparing expected utility under both portfolio strategies. In
doing so we use the precise solution to the T-period investment problem under
active portfolio management since the equilibrium exchange rate, and therefore
Foreign bond return process, has already been computed.
3.1.4 Portfolio Choice
We now turn to the optimal portfolios of attentives and inattentives. Since PPP
holds, Foreign and Home investors face the same real returns and therefore choose
the same portfolio. We assume constant relative risk-aversion preferences over
end-of-life consumption, with a rate of relative risk-aversion of ￿. This runs into
the well-known problem though that for any reasonable rate of risk aversion the
portfolio of attentive investors becomes extremely sensitive to small changes in
expected excess returns. A one percent increase in the expected excess return
can cause investors to easily shift from investing nothing to investing their entire
portfolio in an asset. A natural way to reduce the resulting excessive portfolio
volatility is to introduce parameter uncertainty or transaction costs. But both of
these devices would signi￿cantly complicate the model.20
19See Campbell and Viceira (1999) and references therein.
20For example, transaction costs would lead to non-linear portfolio rules with zones of inaction
for expected excess returns inside some boundaries (s-S rules). See Baldwin (1990) in the context
of the foreign exchange market.
10We adopt a more tractable solution by assuming that it is costly for investors to
deviate too far from a certain benchmark portfolio. To be precise, we assume that
a deviation from a benchmark portfolio leads to a cost that reduces the investment
return by 0:5￿￿2
A￿(bt ￿b)2, where bt is fraction invested in Foreign bonds, b is the
benchmark fraction invested in Foreign bonds, ￿2
A is the conditional variance of
next period’s exchange rate, and ￿ ￿ 0.
Approximating the portfolio choice of attentive investors as that of one-period
horizon investors, we need to maximize EtW
1￿￿
t+1 =(1 ￿ ￿), where next period’s ￿-
























In order to solve for optimal portfolios we approximate the ￿rst order condition
by dropping terms that are higher than second order.21 In a continuous time
framework these terms would drop naturally. In Appendix A.1 we show that this









where bA is a constant, qt+1 = st+1￿st+i￿
t￿it is the excess return on Foreign bonds
and ￿2
A = vart(qt+1) its conditional variance. The benchmark portfolio adjustment
cost therefore dampens the portfolio response to expected return changes by a
factor 1=(1 + ￿).
Inattentives born at time t maximize EtW
1￿￿
t+T =(1￿￿), where Wt+T is end of life
￿nancial wealth that will be consumed. Since inattentives make only one portfolio
decision when born, investing a fraction bI







21Engel and Matsumoto (2005) use the same approach to solve for optimal portfolios in a
general equilibrium model with home bias.
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Following again an approach that drops terms higher than second order from the










where bI is a constant, qt;t+T = qt+1 + :: + qt+T is the cumulative excess return on
Foreign bonds from t to t + T, and ￿2















There is one ￿nal group of investors that we refer to as liquidity traders. These
are modeled exogenously. In the noisy rational expectations literature in ￿nance
it is very common to introduce exogenous noise or liquidity traders since this
noise prevents the asset price from revealing the aggregate of private information.
Here we do not have private information, but the exogenous liquidity traders are
introduced to disconnect the exchange rate from observed macroeconomic shocks.
It is well known since Meese and Rogo￿ (1983) that observed macro fundamentals
explain very little of exchange rate volatility for horizons up to 1 or 2 years. This
is what Lyons (2001) has called the exchange rate determination puzzle. In the
absence of shocks to liquidity trade the exchange rate would only be driven by
interest rate shocks in the model, in clear violation of the empirical evidence.22
The other advantage of introducing liquidity shocks is to be consistent with the
low R2 of regressions of the excess return on the forward discount. While changes in
exchange rates are predictable by the forward discount, the extent of this predictive
power is very limited.
22Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004, 2006) show that in the presence of heterogenous informa-
tion small liquidity shocks can have a large e￿ect on exchange rates movements, so that exchange
rates are disconnected from macroeconomic fundamentals. The exogenous \noise" that is gen-
erated by liquidity supply shocks can also be modeled endogenously, without any implications
for the results. See Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) in the context of the foreign exchange
market.
12Liquidity traders invest xt ￿ W in Foreign bonds at time t, where ￿ W is aggregate
steady state ￿nancial wealth and xt follows an AR process with mean zero:








We ￿nally need to discuss the Foreign bond market clearing condition. There is
a ￿xed supply B of Foreign bonds in the Foreign currency. In real terms it is
Be￿p￿
t = Best. On the demand side each of the T generations of investors has
a total of nA = fn attentive investors and nI = (1 ￿ f)n inattentive investors.
Investors are born with an endowment of one, but their wealth accumulates over
time. Let W A
t￿j;t be the wealth at time t of an attentive investor born at t￿j and
similarly W I
t￿j;t for an inattentive investor born at t ￿ j. These are equal to the
product of total returns over the past j periods. The market clearing condition for















t￿j+1;t + xt ￿ W = Be
st (15)
We will set the real interest rate ￿ r such that the steady state fraction invested
in Foreign bonds by attentives and inattentives together is equal to the benchmark
portfolio b. Then the steady state supply divided by steady state wealth must also
be b: Be￿ s= ￿ W = b. Without loss of generality we will assume that the nominal
supply B is such that this holds for ￿ s = 0.
Several non-linear terms show up in the market clearing condition. Portfolio
demand depends on the product of portfolio shares and wealth, with the latter
being a function of past portfolio shares and returns. The supply is also a non-
linear function of the log-exchange rate. We linearize this budget constraint around
the point where the exchange rate and asset returns are zero and portfolio shares
are equal to b. After linearization we subtract steady state values on both sides of
the market clearing condition and divide by steady state wealth ￿ W. Details can
be found in Appendix A.2 and the Technical Appendix. We will think of liquidity
demand shocks as equivalent to exogenous supply shocks, so that the linearized
net supply after dividing by steady state wealth is bst ￿ xt.
133.2 Solution Method
Details of the solution method are discussed in Appendix A.2 and in the Technical
Appendix. Here we describe the main elements.
3.2.1 Equilibrium Exchange Rate
First, consider a given fraction of attentives f. We conjecture the following equi-






where A(L) and B(L) are in￿nite lag polynomials. Conditional on this conjectured
exchange rate equation we compute excess returns as well as their ￿rst and second
moments that enter into the optimal portfolios. We then solve for the parameters
of the polynomials by imposing the linearized bond market equilibrium condition.
Since this involves an in￿nite number of non-linear equations in the parameters,
we use the fact that the parameters of both polynomials approach zero as the lag
length goes to in￿nity. This is because both interest rate shocks and supply shocks
die out over time. We therefore set the coe￿cients of both polynomials equal
to zero after a long lag. The cuto￿ is chosen very long so that lengthening it
further has a negligible impact on the results. With a cuto￿ at L lags, we then
need to solve 2L + 1 non-linear equations: L equations for the parameters of each
polynomial plus one equation that sets the real interest rate ￿ r such that the steady
state fraction invested in Foreign bonds is b.
3.2.2 Threshold Information Processing Cost
In principle, we should specify the distribution f(￿) of information processing costs
across investors and then ￿nd the equilibrium ￿ and f. Here we will follow the dual
approach: we ￿rst set f, ￿nd ￿(f), and then infer the distribution that is consistent
with this solution. Any distribution of information processing costs such that a
fraction f of investors have a cost less than ￿(f) and a fraction 1 ￿ f has a cost
larger than ￿(f) is consistent with this equilibrium. The advantage of the dual
approach is that we do not have to write down the entire distribution function of
information processing costs, about which little is known. We can instead focus
on the threshold information processing cost ￿(f).
14For the two approaches to be equivalent, the fraction of investors who choose to
be attentive should be constant over time. To this end we assume that an investor
born at time t needs to choose his portfolio strategy at time t before observing the
current state. The latter is assumed to be equal to its unconditional mean with
all past innovations being zero.
Appendix A.3 describes how we solve for the threshold information processing
costs ￿(f) where the expected utility of an investor is equal under the two portfolio
strategies. Here we only provide a brief summary. Consider an attentive investor
born at date t, who makes investment decisions at all dates t,..,t+T ￿1. We need
to solve for the value function at date t. This is done by backward induction. The
value function at t + T is Vt+T = W
1￿￿
t+T =(1 ￿ ￿). For an information processing
cost of ￿ we make an educated guess that the value function at t+j takes the form
Vt+j = (1 ￿ ￿)(1￿￿)(T￿j)evt+jW
1￿￿
t+j =(1 ￿ ￿), where vt+j is a function of the state of
the world at t + j. We then solve for the function vt+j by backwards induction
from the Bellman equation Vt+j = maxbA
t+j Et+jVt+j+1. The maximization over the
optimal portfolio at t+j yields the myopic portfolio (8) plus a term that depends
on the covariance between vt+j+1 and the excess return qt+j+1. We continue to
iterate backwards to time t.





When computing next period’s expected value function we need to discretize the
state space. We allow each innovation to take on N di￿erent values, while preserv-
ing the mean and variance of the distributions. This means that the state space at
t+j can take on N2j possible values. This quickly gets very large when we increase
N. We set N = 3, but we ￿nd virtually identical results for N = 4. We use the
same discrete distribution to compute the optimal portfolio and value function for
inattentives.
3.2.3 Multiple Equilibria
Multiple equilibria could arise in the model and a detailed discussion is given in the
Technical Appendix. More precisely, for a given fraction f of attentive investors
there can be multiple solutions to the equilibrium exchange rate equation. We show
that there is either one equilibrium or three equilibria. However, the possibility of
three equilibria has nothing to do with inattention and it also occurs when there
15are only attentive investors. Multiple equilibria arise as a result of the endogeneity
of the conditional variance of the exchange rate.23 A higher conditional variance
of next period’s exchange rate leads to a bigger impact of supply shocks on the
exchange rate through the risk premium. This can make the higher conditional
variance self-ful￿lling. We ￿nd that three equilibria only arise for an intermediate
range of the standard deviation ￿x of liquidity supply shocks. Below we set ￿x to
match the observed unconditional exchange rate volatility. Even though for a given
￿x there may be multiple equilibria, there is only one ￿x and one corresponding
equilibrium that matches a given level of the unconditional variance of the exchange
rate.24
4 Numerical Results
We now calibrate the model and examine its quantitative implications for excess
return predictability.
4.1 Parameterization
The parameters of the model are chosen as follows. A period is set equal to
one quarter. The parameter   corresponds to the inverse of the derivative of
money demand with respect to the interest rate. Engel and West (2005) discuss
the existing evidence on this parameter, with estimates of 1=  for quarterly data
ranging from 29 to 60. We set   = 0:03, corresponding to 1=  = 33. The AR
process for ut is estimated as follows. From (2) we have ￿ut = i￿
t ￿ (p￿
t ￿ ￿ p￿
t). We
compute ut for the countries and sample period corresponding to the excess return
regression reported in Table 1. The trend price level ￿ p￿
t is approximated with an
HP(1600) ￿lter. We set ￿u and ￿u equal to the average across the countries of the
estimated process. This yields ￿u = 0:957 and ￿u = 0:00248.
The process for the supply xt cannot be observed directly. We set the standard
deviation ￿x of the innovation to this AR process such that the implied exchange
23See McCa￿erty and Driskill (1980) for a discussion of this source of multiplicity.
24Multiple solutions to the equilibrium exchange rate equation for a given f may also lead to
multiple solutions to f for a given distribution function of information processing costs. The
Technical Appendix discusses this in further detail.
16rate volatility in the model matches that in the data. To be precise, ￿x is set such
that the standard deviation of st+1￿st in the model is equal to the GDP weighted
average standard deviation of the one quarter change in the log exchange rate for
the ￿ve currencies and time period of the excess return regression reported in Table
1. The average standard deviation is 0.057. We have little information about the
persistence ￿x of supply shocks, which is set at 0.5.
The rate of relative risk aversion is set at 5, which is probably not too far
from the average of a broad range of empirical estimates of this parameter. We
set b = 0:5, corresponding to a two-country setup with half of the assets supplied
by the US and the other half by the rest of the world. This leaves three key
parameters: f, T and ￿. We will vary these parameters over a wide range to
evaluate their role. In the benchmark parameterization we set f = 0:05, T = 5
and ￿ = 10. While the parameter f is endogenous for a given distribution function
of information processing, our dual approach focuses on the threshold information
processing cost ￿(f).
4.2 Results for Benchmark Parameterization
The ￿rst column in Table 2 reports results for the benchmark parameterization.
The results are consistent with empirical evidence along various dimensions. First,
a regression of the excess return of Foreign bonds on the forward discount yields
a coe￿cient of -1.74, not far from the bias seen in the data reported in Table 1. If
instead all investors were attentive, the coe￿cient would be only -0.29. We refer
to the di￿erence of -1.45 as the bias due to inattention (second row). Second, as
shown in the third row of Table 2, the model implies a large negative coe￿cient
in a regression of the average expectational error on the forward premium. Third,
the annualized threshold information processing cost ￿(f) that is consistent with
the equilibrium is only 2.38%. It is not implausible that 95% of investors face
an information processing cost of at least 2.38%. For example, hedge funds, who
come closest to being fully attentive, charge more than that on an annual basis
through various fees. Fourth (not reported in Table 2), the R2 of the excess return
regression is only 0.038, even a bit lower than in the data.25
25Related to this, 90% of the variance of quarterly exchange rate changes is associated with
liquidity supply shocks, which is consistent with the evidence of a disconnect between exchange
17Finally, the model implies delayed overshooting. This is illustrated in Figure
1, which shows impulse response of the exchange rate in response to a one stan-
dard deviation decrease in the Foreign interest rate. The lower Foreign interest
rate causes an immediate appreciation of the Home currency, followed by a con-
tinued appreciation in the next several quarters, after which is starts to gradually
depreciate. The delayed overshooting is closely related to the excess return pre-
dictability. It implies a negative relationship between the forward discount and
st+1 ￿ st, which by itself leads to a coe￿cient of less than -1 in a regression of the
excess return on the forward discount. In contrast, Figure 1 shows that there is
no delayed overshooting in the absence of inattentives (f = 1). In that case the
exchange rate immediately starts to depreciate subsequent to the shock.
Figure 2 provides some intuition behind the excess return predictability for
the benchmark parameterization. It reports impulse responses to one standard
deviation interest rate and supply shocks. Panels A and B report results for
interest rate shocks and panels C and D for supply shocks. It is immediately
evident from panels A and C that both interest rate and supply shocks lead to a
negative relationship between the excess return and the forward discount.
The other two panels show the response of portfolios of attentives and inat-
tentives to the shocks. This provides the necessary intuition behind the negative
relationship between the excess return and the forward discount. First consider
a drop in the Foreign interest rate. Attentive investors reduce their holdings of
Foreign bonds much more quickly than inattentives, as illustrated in panel B. In
the subsequent quarters inattentives continue to sell Foreign bonds, while atten-
tives gradually increase their holdings of Foreign bonds. The role of inattention is
captured by the decline over time in the relative holdings of Foreign bonds by inat-
tentives, which implies a continued appreciation over time of the Home currency.
This explains the delayed overshooting illustrated in Figure 1. It also explains
the negative relationship between the excess return and the forward discount illus-
trated in panel A of Figure 2. The lower Foreign interest rate raises the forward
discount. The excess return on Foreign bonds is reduced both by the lower interest
rate on Foreign bonds and the continued appreciation of the domestic currency.
Panels C and D of Figure 2 illustrate the dynamic response to a one standard
rates and observed macro fundamentals.
18deviation increase in xt, which is equivalent to a lower supply of Foreign bonds. It
leads to an appreciation of the Foreign currency and therefore lower prices in the
Foreign country. This leads to more expansionary Foreign monetary policy (lower
interest rate) that increases the forward discount fdt by a little bit as shown in
panel C. Panel C shows that at the same time the excess return on Foreign bonds
drops. The excess return would also decrease in the absence of inattentives due to a
lower risk premium on the smaller supply of Foreign bonds.26 But qt+1 drops much
more due to inattention. Since inattentives are slow to respond to a lower expected
return on Foreign bonds, their relative holdings of Foreign bonds is temporarily
higher than that of attentives, as illustrated in panel D. The subsequent drop in
the relative holdings of Foreign bonds by inattentives by itself implies a gradual
appreciation of the Home currency that contributes to the lower excess return on
Foreign bonds.
In the literature, the predictability of excess returns is often written as the
sum of a component due to time-varying risk premia and predictable expectational
errors. More generally, explanations for predictability based on time-varying risk
premia and predictable expectational errors are considered as mutually exclusive.
This is not the case here. On the one hand there are predictable expectational
errors in the model due to rational inattention. On the other hand, from the
perspective of attentive agents one could regard the excess return predictability
as entirely the result of time-varying risk premia.27 If rpt is the risk premium of
attentives, we have Etqt+1 = rpt, where Et is the expectation of attentives. The
excess return is then the sum of the risk premium and the expectational error of
attentives: qt+1 = rpt + (qt+1 ￿ Etqt+1). Since expectational errors by attentives
are not predictable, the predictability of the excess return is entirely associated
with rpt. However, the driving force for excess return predictability in the model
is rational inattention: it is responsible for both the time-varying risk premia of
attentives and predictable expectational errors.
26In the absence of inattentives, this is the mechanism leading to a negative relationship be-
tween the forward discount and excess return in McCallum (1994).
27Since the portfolio of inattentives does not satisfy a standard arbitrage condition at all times,
it is somewhat arbitrary to de￿ne what their risk premium is.
194.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The last ￿ve columns of Table 2 conduct sensitivity analysis for the two key para-
meters f and T. Below we will also brie￿y comment on the parameter ￿. When
we change f we implicitly also change the cumulative distribution function of in-
formation processing costs to be consistent with the higher or lower fraction of
attentives. The same is also the case when we change T or ￿ for a given fraction
of attentives f. In each case we report the threshold information processing cost
that is consistent with an equilibrium for the new parameterization.
Sensitivity analysis can be conducted in two di￿erent ways. The most standard
way is reported in panel A. We only change one parameter (f or T). This answers
the question of how the moments would change if investors become more or less
attentive. In panel B we simultaneously change ￿x in order to match the observed
unconditional standard deviation of st+1 ￿st observed in the data. There the goal
is to ask how well the model can match the data for di￿erent values of f and T.
Panels A and B therefore address di￿erent questions.28
Panel A shows that excess return predictability is very sensitive to the degree
of attentiveness, measured either by the fraction f of attentives or the frequency
T of trading by inattentives. The predictability bias coe￿cient becomes -6.5 in
the absence of attentives (f = 0) and drops to -0.57 when 10% of wealth is held
by attentives (f = 0:1). Similarly, the bias is -6.1 when inattentives hold their
portfolio constant for 8 periods (T = 8) but is only -0.55 when they hold their
portfolio constant for only 3 periods.
Two factors play a role here. First, it is natural that larger pro￿t opportuni-
ties will remain unexploited when investors are less attentive. Second, attentive
investors are less willing to exploit expected pro￿t opportunities when there is a
lot of risk. The less attentive investors are (either lower f or higher T), the more
volatile the exchange rate and therefore the more uncertainty. The reason is that
the exchange rate is much more responsive to liquidity supply shocks when there
are fewer attentive investors to \absorb" these shocks. As shown in panel A, both
the unconditional and conditional volatility rise signi￿cantly for f = 0 or T = 8.
28Multiple equilibria do not arise in either of these panels. For any given level of exchange
rate volatility matched by varying ￿x (panel B) there is only a single equilibrium. Multiple
equilibria could arise in panel A, but this only happens for very small changes in f away from
the benchmark (which we do not report).
20Panel A also suggests that it is unlikely that all investors, or even 10% of
investors, become attentive due to a drop in information processing costs. For
f = 1 we ￿nd that the annual information processing cost ￿ is only 0.02%. This
can therefore only be an equilibrium if all investors have an information processing
cost of less than 0.02%. Even f = 0:1 seems unlikely since it implies that 10%
of investors must have an annual information processing cost of less than 0.63%.
The reason for this result is that when many investors (or even 10% of investors)
become attentive, most pro￿t opportunities will already be exploited and therefore
the gain from being attentive is very low.
The predictability bias coe￿cient is much less sensitive to f and T in panel
B, where ￿x is adjusted to match the unconditional exchange rate volatility in the
data. The reason for this is as follows. Even though by itself a larger number of
attentives would reduce exchange rate volatility, as illustrated in panel A, we now
increase ￿x at the same time to keep the unconditional variance of the exchange
rate unchanged. When the unconditional variance is unchanged with an increase
in f, the conditional variance becomes larger because changes in exchange rates
are less predictable when there are more attentives. The higher conditional vari-
ance implies more uncertainty about future returns, making it less attractive for
attentives to exploit expected pro￿t opportunities. Therefore predictability drops
only slowly if we increase f.
Even for f = 1 the predictability bias remains large, at -1.54. However, in
this case the quarterly standard deviation ￿x of liquidity supply shocks necessary
to match observed exchange rate volatility is 20.56% of aggregate ￿nancial wealth
(for f = 0 it is only 1.94%). Even though we cannot measure these supply shocks
directly, this appears implausibly large. It is not surprising that with such enor-
mous supply shocks one can obtain very large time varying risk premia. Moreover,
expectational errors are not predictable in this case, in contrast to the data. Fi-
nally, the threshold information processing cost is only 0.96%. Since most investors
face a larger cost of information processing, an equilibrium where all investors are
attentive seems improbable.
Table 2 does not report any sensitivity analysis with respect to ￿. The main
point that we like to emphasize about this parameter is that portfolios become
excessively volatile when ￿ is low. For the benchmark where ￿ = 10 the standard
deviation of the quarterly portfolio change of attentives is 51%, which already
21appears large. However, if ￿ = 0 and ￿x is set to match observed exchange rate
volatility, the standard deviation of the quarterly portfolio change of attentives
becomes 480%! Even though we do not have good data to compare this to, for
example from hedge funds, this is implausible.29 When we set ￿ = 20, the standard
deviation of the quarterly change of the portfolio of attentives goes down to 27%.
The overall predictability bias is -1.81 in that case.
5 Conclusion
Understanding why uncovered interest parity does not hold empirically is impor-
tant for policy and for modeling decisions. In this paper we explore a new expla-
nation, based on rational inattention whereby investors make infrequent portfolio
decisions due to a cost of acquiring and processing information. We show that a
calibrated model can match the evidence on the forward discount puzzle. It also
produces delayed overshooting and predictable expectational errors, two important
features of the empirical evidence on exchange rates.
It is useful to emphasize again some key elements regarding the investors in
the model. First, investors are perfectly rational regarding their portfolio choice
and frequency of portfolio decisions. Second, attentive investors do not necessarily
unravel the impact of inattentive investors on excess return predictability. This
is because attentive investors are risk averse and the conditional variance of fu-
ture exchange rates is large. Attentives therefore only make limited bets on excess
returns in their portfolio choice. Finally, we have shown that for reasonable infor-
mation processing costs it can be optimal for only a small fraction of investors to
be attentive.
So far, the literature has made a stark contrast between explanations of the
forward discount puzzle based on the risk premium and explanations based on
expectational errors. Our model sheds new light on this debate. First, we show
that the two types of explanations are not necessarily related to a debate around
the assumption of pure rationality, since predictable expectational errors may exist
when investors are strictly rational but face information processing costs. Second,
our analysis shows that there is no clear-cut distinction between risk premium
29Not surprisingly, this also leads to a very large annual welfare gain from attention, leading
to a threshold information processing cost of 16.2%
22and expectational errors when investors are heterogeneous. More speci￿cally, the
excess return is equal to the risk premium of attentive investors, which in turn is
determined by expectational errors by inattentive investors.
We have kept the model as simple as possible in order to both keep it tractable
and highlight the role of rational inattention. A natural direction for future work
is to integrate the features that we have described here into richer models. In par-
ticular, we abstracted from saving and investment decisions and nominal rigidities.
One could also consider richer monetary policy reaction functions. The introduc-
tion of bonds of di￿erent maturities could shed light on rejections of the expec-
tations hypothesis and the documented closer ￿t of uncovered interest rate parity
over long horizons for long term bonds. Ultimately one would also like to investi-
gate the implications of such models for optimal monetary policy and the choice
of exchange rate regime.
23A Appendix
In this Appendix, we sketch the main steps to derive the portfolios of attentive
and inattentive investors and to solve the model. More details can be found in a
Technical Appendix available upon request.
A.1 Optimal Portfolios
We ￿rst describe how we derive the optimal of portfolio of inattentive investors
(12). Inattentives born at time t maximize EtW
1￿￿
t+T =(1 ￿ ￿) subject to (9)-(11).
































In solving for the optimal portfolio we drop terms that naturally drop out
in continuous time anyway. These are third and higher order terms. Expected
returns and variances are second order terms (depend on dt in continuous ￿nance).
Stochastic returns are ￿rst order, while deterministic returns are second order
(like expected returns). We need to take second order approximations of ￿rst
order variables and ￿rst order approximations of second order variables. This
corresponds to dropping terms higher than second order.
We start by taking a second order approximation of log-portfolio returns around
zero Home and Foreign bond returns. This yields lnR
p
t+j = it+j￿1 + bI
tqt+j + ht,
where ht = 0:5bI
t(1 ￿ bI
t)￿2
A is a second order term. Similarly lnRt+T = it;t+T +
bI
tqt;t+T + Tht, where it;t+T = it + :: + it+T￿1.




















24In equilibrium log excess returns will be normally distributed, so that the expec-























Since the terms in the exponentials are second order, we need to only take a
￿rst order approximation around these terms being zero (replacing ex with 1+x).
Doing so, and dropping a third order term that multiplies bI










2(vart(qt+j) ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)cov(qt+j;qt;t+T)) =
(1 ￿ b
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t ￿ b) (21)











An alternative way of deriving the same portfolio is to take a second order approx-
imation of the ￿rst order condition around zero returns, then replace returns with
second order approximations and then take expectations (dropping higher than
second order terms).
The optimal portfolio for attentives can be derived following the same procedure
as above. This corresponds to setting T = 1 and ￿2
I = ￿2
A in the portfolio of






25A.2 Solving the Equilibrium Exchange Rate
First we linearize the market equilibrium condition. The algebraic details can be
found in the Technical Appendix. After subtracting the steady state from both




















2~ qt￿j+1 + wxt = wbst (24)







and ￿ Rp = (1￿b)e￿ r+b. The Technical Appendix also derives the steady-state mar-
ket equilibrium condition:
f￿ b






(T ￿ j)￿ r(1 ￿ b) = wb (25)
















Then we conjecture (16) with
A(L) = a1 + a2L + a3L
2 + ::: (28)
B(L) = b1 + b2L + b3L
2 + ::: (29)
Substituting (16) into the market equilibrium condition (24), we obtain an
equilibrium exchange rate equation. We then need to equate the conjectured to
the equilibrium exchange rate equation, which allows us to solve for the parameters
in the lag operators. As mentioned in the main text, we set the coe￿cients aj = 0
and bj = 0 for j > L. We then have 2L + 1 non-linear equations to solve for
a1;::;aL, b1;::;bL and ￿ r: 2L equations equating the conjectured to the equilibrium
coe￿cients of the exchange rate equation and the steady state market equilibrium
equation (25). Further algebraic details can be found in the Technical Appendix.
In the application to quarterly data we set L = 60. Increasing L further has a
negligible impact on results.
26A.3 Threshold Information Processing Cost
The function ￿(f) is computed by equating the value functions of being attentive
and inattentive. We describe this procedure below. The Technical Appendix
describes each step in detail.
First consider an attentive investor born at date t, who makes investment deci-
sions at all dates t,.., t + T ￿ 1. We need to solve for the value function at date t.
This is done by backward induction. We start with the known value function at
t + T, Vt+T = W
1￿￿
t+T =(1 ￿ ￿). We make an educated guess that the value function
at date t + j is




t+j =(1 ￿ ￿) (30)
where ￿ is the information processing cost as a fraction of periodic wealth and








. It is immediate







t+j is the fraction invested in Foreign bonds.
In order to solve for vt+j for a known vt+j+1 as a function of the state at t+j+1,























If we know the optimal portfolio bA
t+j, this allows us to solve the time t + j value
function from the time t + j + 1 value function.
We solve for the optimal portfolio in a way similar to that described in Appendix
A.1, dropping terms from the ￿rst order condition that are higher than second
order and therefore naturally disappear in continuous time. We leave a detailed














27where bA is the constant term de￿ned in (23). The optimal portfolio is therefore
the same as derived for myopic investors, plus a hedge term that depends on the
covariance between the excess return and vt+j+1. The last term is new and re￿ects
a hedge against the parameter vt+j+1 of next period’s value function, which will
depend on next period’s expected returns. In practice we ￿nd that even though the
hedge term is non-zero and time-varying, it is swamped by the standard myopic
portfolio term.
Having derived the optimal portfolio, we can solve the value function by back-
ward induction using (33). In order to compute expectations, both in (33) and
(34), we need to discretize the state space. A N(0;1) distribution is approximated




n + n(i ￿ 1) (35)
where n is the space between innovations. If ￿(:) is the cumulative normal distri-
bution, the probability ￿(i) of observation i is
￿1 = ￿N = 0:5(￿(m1) + ￿(m2)) (36)
￿i = 0:5(￿(mi+1) ￿ ￿(mi￿1)) i = 2;::;N ￿ 1 (37)
We choose the step n such that the standard deviation of this discretized distribu-
tion is 1. If N ! 1, the discrete distribution approaches the N(0;1) distribution.
Innovations in x (u) are drawn from the discretized N(0;1) distribution times
standard deviation ￿x (￿u).
If i1 and i2 are the numbers of the innovations from the discretized normal
distribution of respectively ￿u
t+j+1 and ￿x


















Substituting the optimal portfolio (34), evaluated at the discretized state space,
we can then solve for the period t+j value function from the period t+j+1 value
function.
























































Following exactly the same method as described above for attentive investors
we obtain the same portfolio as in (12). There is no dynamic hedge term since there
is only one portfolio decision to make. Expectations and variances in the portfolio
are now computed with respect to the discretized probability space. Given the
solution for the optimal portfolio, the parameter vI from the time t value function
follows directly from (42).
Having solved for the value functions of both attentive and inattentive investors,
it is now straightforward to compute the threshold information processing cost
￿(f). It is such that an investor facing this information processing cost has the
same expected utility whether attentive or inattentive. Equating attentive and







￿(f) = 1 ￿ e
vI￿vt
T(1￿￿) (44)
This is the cost per period. If there are 4 periods in a year, as we have assumed in
the application to the data, then the annual threshold information processing cost
in percentage terms is 400 times (44). Those numbers are reported in Table 2.
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34Panel A : Predictable Excess Returns
￿st+1 ￿ fdt = ￿ + ￿fdt + "t+1 1978:11 ￿ 2004:12
Average slopes of system with 5 currencies (against US dollar)
Equal Weights GDP Weights
￿ ￿(￿) R2 ￿ ￿(￿) R2
￿2:80￿￿￿ 0.56 0.11 ￿3:17￿￿￿ 0.58 0.12
Panel B: Predictable Expectational Errors
st+1 ￿ se
t+1 = ￿ + ￿fdt + "t+1 1986:8 ￿ 2004:10
Average slopes of system with 5 currencies (against US dollar)
Equal Weights GDP Weights
￿ ￿(￿) R2 ￿ ￿(￿) R2
￿1:89￿￿￿ 0.73 0.052 ￿1:37￿￿￿ 0.64 0.032
The ￿ve currencies are the German mark, British pound, Japanese yen, Canadian dollar, and Swiss franc.
Panel A: Currency spot rates are end-of-period rates from IFS. ￿st+1 refers to the 3-month change in the
log exchange rate. The forward discount is equal to the interest rate di￿erential. Interest rates are 3-month
rates as quoted in the London Euromarket and were obtained from Datastream (Thomson Financial). Panel
B: Exchange rate expectations are based on survey data of 3-month exchange rate expectations by 43 large
￿nancial institutions, compiled monthly since 1986 by Forecasts Unlimited, Inc. The survey is answered
each month over a period of three business days. The spot rate st+1 is the average log-spot exchange
rate over the three business days of the survey response plus 3 months. Standard errors of the average
slopes are computed from the (asymptotically) multivariate normal distribution of the slope estimates. This
distribution is estimated from a SUR estimation of the ￿ve regressions using the robust Newey-West with 4
lags. Coe￿cients with a signi￿cance of 1% are denoted by ***.
Table 1: Predictability of Excess Returns and Expectational Errorsbenchmark f = 0 f = 0:1 f = 1 T = 8 T = 3
T = 5, f = 0:05
￿ = 10, ￿x = 0:5
Panel A: hold ￿x constant
excess return predictability: -1.74 -6.51 -0.57 -0.29 -6.09 -0.55
coe￿cient ￿ of regression
￿st+1 ￿ fdt = ￿ + ￿fdt
bias due to inattention -1.45 -6.22 -0.28 0 -5.80 -0.26
(compare to bias for f = 1)
predictable expectational errors -0.80 -4.08 -0.07 0 -4.11 -0.08
coe￿cient ￿ of regression
￿st+1 ￿ ￿ Et(￿st+1) = ￿ + ￿fdt
unconditional standard 5.70 16.85 3.13 2.76 16.2 3.20
deviation st+1 ￿ st (%)
conditional standard 4.17 12.50 2.83 2.72 12.8 2.79
deviation st+1 ￿ st (%)
threshold information processing 2.38 2.25 0.63 0.02 2.01 0.63
cost ￿(f) (percent per year)
Panel B: hold unconditional standard
deviation st+1 ￿ st constant at 5.70%
excess return predictability: -1.74 -1.95 -1.67 -1.50 -1.88 -1.61
coe￿cient ￿ of regression
￿st+1 ￿ fdt = ￿ + ￿fdt
bias due to inattention -1.45 -1.66 -1.38 0 -1.59 -1.32
(compare to bias for f = 1)
predictable expectational errors -0.80 -0.84 -0.72 0 -0.95 -0.60
coe￿cient ￿ of regression
￿st+1 ￿ ￿ Et(￿st+1) = ￿ + ￿fdt
￿x (%) 4.29 1.95 5.82 20.13 3.26 6.64
conditional standard 4.17 3.51 4.36 4.98 4.41 3.91
deviation st+1 ￿ st (%)
threshold information processing 2.38 2.72 2.09 0.96 2.23 2.30
cost ￿(f) (percent per year)
Table 2: Excess Return Predictability in the ModelFigure 1 Delayed Overshooting--Impulse Response Exchange Rate to Interests Rate Shock*
log exchange rate
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benchmark parameterization
no inattentives (f=1)
*The figure shows the impulse response of the log exchange rate to a one standard deviation interest rate shock (decrease in the foreign interest rate)         
for both the benchmark parameterization and the case of no inattentives. For the latter we set f=1 and leave other parameters the same as under the   
benchmark parameterization.Figure 2 Impulse Responses to Interests Rate and Supply Shocks*
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Panel C Impulse response to one standard deviation supply shock
forward discount
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*Values of model parameters: ψ =0.03, ρu=0.957, ρx=0.5, σu=0.00248, γ=5,  b=0.5, T=5, f=0.05 and ϕ=10. The standard deviation σx of supply shocks is set such 
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Panel B Impulse response to one standard deviation interest rate shock